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NOTES
PAYDAY LOAN SOLUTIONS: SLAYING
THE HYDRA (AND KEEPING IT DEAD)
1. INTRODUCTION
The storefronts and signs are hard to miss. They scream out for
attention, usually in bright yellow or red letters, or perhaps green
dollar signs. They promise quick cash and easy money. They offer
low hassle and no credit checks. Just write them a check and you are
out the door with cash in hand. They promise a solution: a payday
loan. What they deliver is something else entirely. Rather than
provide a path out of debt or a helping hand through a financial
shortfall, these loans mostly serve to accelerate a downward spiral of
increasing debt and further financial hardship. The payday loan,
unlike many mainstream forms of credit, builds wealth only for the
lender. The payday loan, by design, leaves borrowers in a worse
predicament than the one that drove them to seek it in the first place.
Payday loans are a wealth-depleting product that for too long has
been allowed relatively free reign throughout the majority of U.S.
states.
This Note addresses the broad problem of payday loans in a series
of steps, beginning with basic background and proceeding towards a
conclusion that not only is government intervention necessary to
solve the problems posed by payday loans, but that this intervention
must be of a particular character in order to succeed. Part I is this
introduction. Part 11 describes payday loans in terms of operation,
evolution and growth, and customer attributes. Part III explores a
variety of reasons why payday loans are problematic and focuses on
product design, product implementation, and the legal framework
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within which payday lenders operate. Part IV creates a model for
assessing solutions to these problems, both individually and as a
whole. Part V applies that model and evaluates types and degrees of
solutions to the payday lending problem. Part VI concludes that an
effective solution to payday lending incorporates not only legal
restrictions, but also alternative products. These restrictions and
alternatives must be mandated at the federal level because of the race-
to-the-bottom problem of state-by-state action, the profit-based
motivation of mainstream lenders and the failure of deregulation and
market operation to solve the problem.
Most academic and legal critiques of payday lending begin with
the story of some individual who, faced with desperate financial
circumstances, took out a payday loan, only to become trapped in a
repeating cycle of debt that eventually cost her far more than the
initial loan and ended up causing far greater financial hardship than
the loan was initially taken out to remedy. There are many good
reasons for such an approach. The anecdote provides a human face
for the problem and attempts to make the reader empathize with the
borrower's plight. It may also serve to explain the basic operation of
the payday lending business model and to describe the cost structure
of the loans.
Despite all of these good reasons, this Note does not begin with
such a story. While there is certainly a value in telling these stories,
individualizing the problem places the emphasis on the individualized
circumstances within. The message conveyed, while effective, is
limited in scope-such stories focus attention on how payday lending
was bad for a particular person and then extrapolate to argue that
payday lending is therefore bad for all (or most) people and therefore
ought to be constrained or banned. While the conclusion is certainly
valid, this Note focuses not on the small scale but rather on the large.
Payday lending is a problem that affects society as a whole. Its
existence is the result of forces that affect all of us-in
particular, it is the result of the failures of a significant national policy
trend toward deregulation. The problem of payday lending is simply
too large to be contained in any one person's experience.
11. PAYDAY LOANS DESCRIBED
A Operation
There are several basic definitions of what exactly a payday loan
is. One study describes payday loans as financial devices "marketed
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as short-term cash advances obtained by submitting a postdated check
or electronic checking account information as collateral for the loan."'
Another simply defines payday loans as "short-term, high-interest
loans against a subsequent paycheck.",2
In a typical transaction, a customer goes to a storefront and writes
a check for the amount borrowed plus interest and fees. In Ohio,3
customers were able to borrow up to $800.4 The lender could charge
interest on the loan at an amount up to 5% "per month or
fraction of a month," and the loan could have a term of up to six
months.6 In addition to interest, the lender could charge loan
origination fees of up to $5 for every $50 loaned for the first $500 of
the principal and $3.75 per every $50 loaned for the remainder of the
principal up to the maximum allowed by law.7
Typically, a customer paid $15 per every $ 100 borrowed over the
standard two-week term for these loans.8 This fee structure resulted in
an annual percentage rate (APR) of 391 %.9 At the end of the term, the
customer was required to repay the entire loan, along with interest
and fees. A customer unable to repay the entirety at the end of the
term was faced with two options: default or take out a new loan.'0
IOHIO COALITION FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, TRAPPED By DESIGN: PAYDAY
LENDING BY THE NUMBERS 3 (2007), available at http://ohiocoalitionforresponsiblelending.org/
Trapped%20ByO/o2ODesign%/2OFinal.pdf.
2 DAVID ROTHSTEIN & JEFFREY D. DILLMAN, TRAPPED IN DEBT: THE GRowrH
OF PAYDAY LENDING IN OHIO 1 (2007), available at http://www.policymattersohio.org/
pdf/TrappedlnDebt2007.pdf [hereinafter ROTHSTEIN & DILLMAN, TRAPPED IN DEBT].
3Ohio is the focus of this analysis for several reasons. Ohio's current authorizing statute
is typical, Ohio has demographics that mirror the nation, Ohio has been the focus of several
intensive studies on payday lending, and, most importantly, Ohio has recently passed
comprehensive legislation to reform payday lending within the state. H.R. 545, 127th Gen.
Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2007). References to the Ohio example are consequently dealt with in
the past tense, though in many other states the practice continues as described.
4 0OH10 REV. CODE ANN. § 1315.39(A)(1) (West 2004 & Supp. 2007) (repealed Sept. 1,
2008).
5OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 13 15.39(B) (West 2004 & Supp. 2007) (repealed Sept. 1,
2008).
6 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1315.3 9(A)(2) (West 2004 & Supp. 2007) (repealed Sept. 1,
2008).
7OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1315.40(A) (West 2004 & Supp. 2007) (repealed Sept. 1,
2008); OHIO DEP'T OF COMMERCE, Div. OF FIN. INSTS., PAYDAY LOANS,
http://www.com.state.oh.us/dfipub/0CA /2OPayday/o20Loan.pdf (last visited Sept. 30, 2008).
Payday lenders tend to charge the maximum allowed by law. In fact, a recent study in Ohio
noted that they were unable to uncover instances where lenders charged below the legal
maximums. ROTHSTEIN & DILLMAN, TRAPPED IN DEBT, supra note 2, at 9.
8 OHIO COAL.ITON FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, supra note 1, at 3; OHIO DEP'T OF
COMMERCE, DIV. OF FIN. INSTS., supra note 7; ROTHSTEIN & DILLMAN, TRAPPED IN DEBT,
supra note 2, at 1.
9OHIO COALITION FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, supra note 1, at 3; ROTH4STEIN &
DILLMAN, TRAPPED IN DEBT, supra note 2, at 1. See generally ELIZABETH RENuART ET AL.,
TRuTH IN LENDING §§ 3.1-2 (5th ed. 2003).
10 ROTHSTEIN & DILLMAN, TRAPPED IN DEBT, supra note 2, at 2.
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If the customer defaulted, the lender cashed the check. If the check
bounced, the borrower not only still owed on the loan and its fees, but
also was responsible for an additional $20 collection charge to the
lender, in addition to "any amount passed on from other financial
institutions for each check, negotiable order of withdrawal, share
draft, or other negotiable instrument returned or dishonored for any
reason."" The lender could then pursue a civil action to collect on the
loan. 12
The more common option was for the borrower to take out a new
loan to pay off the original loan. This happened in several different
ways. In some states, lenders allow the customer to "roll over" the
loan by extending the term for an additional two weeks-if the
customer agrees to pay a new set of interest and fees on the
extension.'" Ohio law, however, prohibited such "roll overs."' The
industry in Ohio responded to the prohibition on "rollover" by
structuring "back-to-back" transactions, in which the customer paid
off the existing loan and then took out a new loan from the same
lender to cover the pay-off.'5 A customer could also obtain a new loan
from another lender to pay off the existing loan.' 6 The end result of
any of these choices is the same: the customer incurs more expenses,
still has a loan, and still owes the entire principal.
Going by the averages paints a picture of how the typical payday
loan plays out over time. In Ohio, a recent study found that the
average payday loan principal was $328.84.'17 For every two week
loan, the borrower pays approximately 15% of the amount borrowed.
For a $100.00 loan, this fee is approximately $15.00, for a $200.00
loan, $30.00, and so on. For the average loan of $328.84, the
two-week cost is $49.3318 If at the end of the two-week term, the
borrower cannot pay off the loan in full, the loan is extended,
refinanced or paid off with a new loan. Regardless of the exact
1OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 13 15.40(B) (West 2004 & Supp. 2007) (repealed Sept. 1,
2008). These fees are in addition to any that might be charged by the borrower's bank for the
returned check Id
12 OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 13 15.40(C) (West 2004 & Supp 2007) (repealed Sept. 1,
2008). See also ROTHSTEIN & DILLMAN, TRAPPED IN DEBT, supra note 2, at I11 (stating that
legal costs for borrowers may approach the original amount of the loan).
13 URJAH KING ET AL., FINANCIAL QUICKSAND: PAYDAY LENDING SINKS BORROWERS IN
DEBT WITH $4.2 BILLION IN PREDATORY FEES EVERY YEAR 3-4 (2006), available at
http://www.responsiblelending.org/pdfs/rr0l2-FinancialQuicksand-l 106.pdf.
14 OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1315.41(E) (West 2004 & Supp. 2007) (repealed Sept. 1,
2008).
15 ROTHSTIN & DILLMAN, TRAPPED IN DEBT, supra note 2, at 2; see also KING ET AL.,
supra note 13, at 4; OHIO COALITON FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, supra note 1, at 5.
16 OHIO COALITON FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, supra note 1, at 3, 5.
17 Id. at 4.
18 Id.
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process, the basic form is the same-another two weeks for another
15% fee. While 15% may not seem all that steep for a one-time
transaction, it adds up quickly--especially considering that the
average borrower takes out a total of 12.6 payday loans each year.' 9
By the thirteenth loan,2 the borrower has paid approximately $640.00
in fees-almost double the amount actually borrowed .2 ' The
following chart illustrates the accumulation of costs:
Cost Of $328.84 Loan
1800.00
$700.00 --- -~ -- -- - - - ---- -- - --- - --
$600.00
$500.00 ---- ~ -
$400.00
$300.00
$200.00
$100.00
$0.00 ------
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 1.3
Loanl # F2
B. Evolution and Growth
The modem payday loan emerged in the early 1990s. W. Allen
Jones is recognized as the father of the modem payday loan, which he
19 Id at 2, 5 (arriving at 12.6 loans as a conservative calculation based on per-store data
and numbers obtained by previous studies assessing the average number of different companies
used by borrowers throughout a year). But see GREGORY ELLIEHAUSEN & EDWARD C.
LAWRENCE, PAYDAY ADVANCE CREDIT IN AMERICA: AN ANALYSIS OF CONSUMER DEMAND
38 (2001), available at http://www.gwu.edu/.-business/research/centers/fsrp/Pdf/Mono35.pdf
(suggesting a lower number of renewals and repeat usage).
20 At a two-week term per loan, this equals approximately six months. Because of the
nature of the loans and the fee structure, it does not matter whether these six months were
contiguous or whether the borrowing was spread throughout the year.
21 OHIO COALITION FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, supra note 1, at 5.
22 Id. at 4 (describing the per-loan cost of the average $328.84 loan as $49.33 per
two-week term).
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began making in 1993 in Cleveland, Tennessee.23 Soon after, payday
lending spread and grew quickly. In 1995, for instance, Ohio passed
legislation specifically exempting payday lenders from usury laws,24
and the industry rapidly expanded there. Other states that passed
authorizing statutes experienced similar growth.25 In the late 1990s
payday lenders went to great lengths to characterize themselves not as
lenders, but as merely "providing a service for a set fee," thereby
escaping the provisions of the Truth in Lending Act (TILA).26 By
2000, TILA was deemed applicable to payday loans,27 yet payday
lending still increased at a furious pace. According to a survey of
Ohio Department of Commerce data, there were 107 payday lending
locations operating in Ohio in 1996.28 By 2006, that number had
increased to 1,562 locations statewide. 29 The same study notes
ironically that "[t]here are now more check cash lending shops than
McDonalds, Burger King, and Wendy's restaurants combined in
Ohio.,30 By late 2007, the total number had expanded to 1,638
locations, representing a further five percent increase. Other
numbers show that the payday lending industry has grown from
virtually zero locations in 1993 to approximately 25,000 locations
23 Richard J. Thomas, Rolling Over Borrowers: Preventing Excessive Refinancing and
Other Necessary Changes in the Payday Loan Industry, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2401, 2401
(2007); see also Check Into Cash, W. Allan Jones, http://www.checkintocash.com/allan.htm
(last visited Sept. 23, 2008).
24 H.R. 313, 121st Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 1995); see also OHIO COAL. FOR
RESPONSIBLE LENDING, supra note 1, at 2. Usury is the traditional term used to describe high
cost loans; most states have usury laws that limit the interest rates that lenders can charge. Ohio,
for instance, describes "criminal usury" as "illegally charging, taking, or receiving any money
or other property as interest on an extension of credit at a rate exceeding twenty-five per cent
per annum or the equivalent rate for a longer or shorter period." OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
2905.21(H) (West 2004).
25 See Steven M. Graves & Christopher L. Peterson, Predatory Lending and the Military:
The Law and Geography of "Payday" Loans in Military Towns, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 653, 674-75
(2005); see also SHEILA BAIR, Low COST PAYDAY LOANS: OPPORTUNITIES AND OBSTACLES 7
(2005), available at http://www.aecforg/upload/publicationfiles/fes3622h334.pdf.
26 Thomas A. Wilson, The Availability of Statutory Damages under TILA to Remedy the
Sharp Practice ofPayday Lenders, 7 N.C. BANKING INST. 339, 343 (2003).
27 Truth in Lending, 65 Fed. Reg. 17,129 (Mar. 31, 2000) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt.
226) (discussing Official Staff Commentary to Regulation Z § 226.2(a)(14)-2 and the Truth in
Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1667f).
28 ROTHSTEIN & DILLMAN, TRAPPED IN DEBT, supra note 2, at 3.
29 Id.
30 Id; see also John D. Hawke, Jr., Comptroller of the Currency, Remarks Before the
ABA National Community and Economic Development Conference (Mar. 18, 2002),
http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/release/2002-24a.txt ("California alone has more payday loan
offices-nearly 2,000-than it does McDonalds and Burger Kings, and other states are not very
far behind.").
31 DAVID ROTHSTEIN & JEFFREY D. DILLMAN, THE CONTINUED GROWTH OF PAYDAY
LENDING IN OHIO 4 (2008), available at http://www.policymattersohio.org/pdf/
ContinuedGrowthOfPaydayLendinglnOhio2008_0319.pdf [hereinafter ROTHSTEIN & DILLMAN,
CONTINUED GROWTH].
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nationwide by the end of 2006.3 The amount of money handled by
these lenders has also grown, from essentially nothing prior to 1993
to approximately $28 billion in 2006.~
Payday lending operations are organized in a variety of ways;
however, the majority of locations in Ohio are chains or franchises.3
As of 2006, the top ten lenders represented 55 percent of Ohio's
payday lending locations, with the top two lenders having well over
one hundred locations each.3 Four of Ohio's ten largest lenders were
publicly-owned corporations.3 Early on, payday lenders were heavily
concentrated in urban areas37 but quickly spread to the rest of the
state. In fact, the greatest number of payday lending locations per
capita exists in rural counties.3
C. Customers
While there are varying perspectives on the characteristics of
payday loan borrowers, some features are certain. The majority of
borrowers have jobs (or at least sources of regular income), and all
have a checking account.3 Payday loan customers are not the
un-banked; rather they are the "underbanked," those who "may
lack the savings, credit history, or financial know-how to avoid
purchasing a high-cost credit instrument."40 There are two competing
profiles of the population that make the most use of payday loans.
The industry's profile, rooted in the Georgetown Study, describes a
typcalmidleAmricn 41 The study found that the majority of
payday loan customers had "family incomes between $25,000 and
$49 '999.,,42 This customer also tended to be married, often with
children, and below the age of 45.4 The study also found that only a
small percentage of customers lacked a high school diploma and that
the vast majority of customers had finished high school or had
attended some college."4 The authors concluded that "a relatively
32 Consumer Fed'n of Am., Payday Loan Consumer Information,
http://www.paydayloaninfo.org/facts.cfm (last visited Sept. 23, 2008).
33' Id; KING ET AL., supra note 13, at 2.
34 ROTHSTEIN & DILLMAN, TRAPPED IN DEBT, supra note 2, at 8.
35 Id
36 OHIO COALITION FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, supra note 1, at 3-4.
37 ROTHSTEIN & DILLMAN, TRAPPED IN DEBT, supra note 2, at 5.
38 ROTHSTEIN & DILLMAN, CONTINUED GROWTH, supra note 3 1, at 3.
39 See ROTHSTEIN & DILLMAN, TRAPPED IN DEBT, supra note 2, at2.
40 Michael S. Bafr, Banking the Poor, 21 YALE J. ON REG. 121, 153 (2004) (defining
"underbanked").
41 ELLIEHAUSEN & LAWRENCE, supra note 19, at 28.
42 Id
43 Id at 29, 30.
44Id at 33.
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small percentage of payday advance customers have low income or
low levels of education.A5 Overall, the Georgetown Study describes
the payday loan customer as part of a typical, working, middle-class
family who saw payday loans as avaluable service 46 and used them
infrequently,47 most often in response to an unexpected expense .48 it
is worth pointing out that significant faults have been found with the
selection of the sample used in, and the funding of, the Georgetown
Study; however, the industry and its advocates continue to use it.4 9
Consumer advocate studies reveal a different customer. A study
done by the Colorado Administrator of the Uniform Consumer Credit
Code revealed that "[tlhe 'average' Colorado payday loan borrower is
a thirty-six year-old single woman, making $2,370 per month."50 This
portrait is corroborated by a study from Illinois, which "found that the
average payday loan borrower's salary was just over $25,000, while
the average income for citizens of the state as a whole was over
$3 1,000.,,5 1 These figures, taken together with other reports, suggest
that most borrowers are not typical middle-class Americans, but are
hovering somewhere near the edge of poverty.5
The studies show that people use payday loans for a variety of
purposes, though the dominant factor remains some sort of
unexpected financial crunch. Other reasons often cited include "the
speed of the service, the ease of the transactions, the convenience, the
personal service, and the lack of viable alternatives," as well as the
fact that payday lending outlets have longer and more convenient
hours than banks.5 The Georgetown Study also suggested that
borrowers choose payday loans for reasons of convenience, 54 and that
many use payday loans to further extend other exhausted sources of
41 Id. at 5 5.
46 See id. at 35 ("Ninety-two percent of customers strongly agreed or somewhat agreed
with the statement, 'Payday advance companies provide a useful service to consumers."').
47 See id. at 3 8.
48 Id at 47. Recent industry-backed efforts to override Ohio's new restrictive payday loan
law rely on the imagery of the payday loan customer as a hard-working, responsible, middle-
class person faced with a short-term need for cash to cover unexpected expenses. See Jim
Siegel, Payday Lenders Invoke Farm Images for Their Pitch but Sow Half-Truths, PLAIN
DEALER (Cleveland, Ohio), Aug. 12, 2008, at B2 (ranking a statewide television ad as a 3 on a
scale from 0 (misleading) to 10 (truthful)).
49 Thomas, supra note 23, at 2404-06.
50 Paul Chessin, Borrowing from Peter to Pay Paul: A Statistical Analysis of Colorado's
Deferred Deposit Loan Act, 83 DENy. U. L. REv. 387, 405 (2005). The yearly salary calculates
out to $28,440.
51 Thomas, supra note 23, at 2406 (citations omitted).
52 See BAIR, supra note 25, at 8 ("[Borrowers] are middle- and lower-middle-income
workcrs, with 52 percent of households making between $25,000 and $50,000 [per year].").
53 Scott Andrew Schaaf, From Checks to Cash: The Regulation of the Payday Lending
Industry, 5 N.C. BANKING INST. 339,344 (200 1).
54 ELLIEHAUSEN & LAWRENCE, supra note 19, at 5 1.
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credit.55 That study observed that a very small percentage of
borrowers resorted to payday loans as an option of last resort .56 The
high cost of payday loans, however, along with the simple fact that
people with access to prime credit products fail to flock to payday
lenders for credit, suggest that beneath the other reasons lies one
primary motivating factor: most borrowers perceive that they do not
have a better option. The evidence suggests that they are, for the most
part, correct. Payday loans do fill a gap in the market that is generally
not served by mainstream lenders.5
111. PAYDAY LoANs ARE PROBLEMATIC
A. Design
The problems associated with payday loans are rooted deep in
their design. The fundamental problem is that payday loans, unlike
more formalized and mainstream credit options, do not serve as a
means of financial improvement for borrowers.5 Instead, they often
leave borrowers in a worse position than when they sought the loan to
begin with.59 This effect is no accident.
1. The Debt Trap
The payday lending business model incorporates several features
that function to extend loans and prevent borrowers from paying off
the loan and walking away free and clear. These features are the short
term of the loan coupled with a balloon payment and the lack of an
option to repay the loan in installments.60 If the customer cannot pay
55 Id at v.
56 Id. at 52 (finding that only six percent of the customers surveyed used payday loans
because all other options were closed to them).
51 See id. at iv (crediting the emergence of payday loans to meeting "unfulfilled demand
for very small, short-term consumer loans"); Schaaf, supra note 53, at 340-41 (attributing the
growth of the payday loan industry "to the deregulation of the banking industry, the absence of
traditional small loan providers in the small-sum, short-term credit market, and the elimination
of interest rate caps"). Schaaf explains that as banks abandoned the small loan market in the
1980's in favor of larger loans, customers were left without good options for achieving this sort
of credit. Id.; see also Barr, supra note 40, at 152 (pointing to deregulation, the replacement of
installment sales with credit card sales, a shift by finance companies from small loans to home
equity financing, a decrease in savings, and an increase in the number of people with adverse
credit histories as reasons for the rise of payday lending).
58 Regina Austin, Of Predatory Lending and the Democratization of Creditr Preserving
the Social Safety Net of Informality in Small-Loan Transactions, 53 Am. U. L. REV. 1217, 1255
(2004).
59 Id. (describing how payday loans not only tend to increase a borrower's financial
hardship, but also fail to reward borrowers for reliability, as would a positive mark on a credit
rating).
60 See KING ET AL., supra note 13, at 3. See also Charles A. Bruch, Taking the Pay Out of
20081 133
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off the loan completely, then he becomes entrapped in the "debt
cycle." 6 1 Lenders reject any attempts at partial payments, instead
forcing a complete refinancing of the loan.6 The shortfall or
unexpected expense that precipitated the initial loan is quickly
dwarfed by the cost of the loan itself-the hole simply grows
deeper.6 One author explains:
Once [a borrower] dedicates a large portion of his paycheck
to repayment of the first loan, the borrower will likely find it
difficult to stretch the remainder of the paycheck until the
next payday while continuing to pay regular expenses.
Whatever necessitated the first payday loan (e.g., car trouble,
a sick child, or marital difficulties) may continue to generate
unplanned expenses, making it more difficult for the
borrower to scrape by until the next payday. If the borrower
loses this battle, he will likely take out a new loan to bridge
the gap. Unfortunately, the loan fees associated with this new
loan will jeopardize his ability to pay all of his bills in the
next period, perpetuating the cycle of dependency.64
Payday Loans: Putting an End to the Usurious and Unconscionable Interest Rates Charged by
Payday Lenders, 69 U. CIN. L. REV. 1257, 1273 (2001) (noting that the fundamental difference
between payday loans and pawns is that while "[a] customer can forfeit his pawn and walk away
from the transaction with no liability," a payday loan customer "cannot simply surrender his
security and walk away [because] he remains legally obligated to pay the principal, interest, and
extension fees on the loan, and he must deal with the consequences if a lender tries to cash his
usually worthless post-dated check").
61 Diane Hellwig, Exposing the Loansharks in Sheep's Clothing Why Re-Regulating the
Consumer Credit Market Makes Economic Sense, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1567, 1576 (2005);
see also KING ET AL., supra note 13, at 4 ("[Ojver time the borrower finds it harder to pay off
the loan principal for good as fees are stripped from their earnings every payday. They are
frequently trapped paying this interest for months or even years, and many go to a second or
third payday lender in an often fruitless attempt to escape the trap.") (citation omnitted); URIAH
KING & LESLIE PARRISH, CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, SPRINGING THE DEBT TRAP: RATE
CAPS ARE ONLY PROVEN PAYDAY LENDING REFORM 7 (2007), available at
http://www.responsiblelending.org/pdfs/springing-the-debt-trap.pdf ("The high price of a
payday loan and the fact that it must be paid off in one lump sum two short weeks later,
virtually ensures cash-strapped borrowers will be unable to meet their basic expenses and pay
off their loan with a single paycheck.").
62 Thomas, supra note 23, at 2412.
63 Lynn Drysdale & Kathleen E. Keest, The Two-Tiered Consumer Financial Services
Marketplace: The Fringe Banking System and Its Challenge to Current Thinking About the Role
of Usury Laws in Today's Society, 51 S.C. L. REV. 589, 609 (2000) (explaining that the structure
of payday loans extends and increases the initial burden that led the customer to the loan in the
first place).
64 Hellwig, supra note 61, at 1576; see also ROTHSTEIN & DILLMAN, CONTINUED
GROWTH, supra note 3 1, at 10 ("Given the high interest rates and short loan terms, it is difficult
for most payday lending customers to pay back their loans on time without resorting to taking
out another loan. This is particularly true for families on fixed incomes, such as those receiving
134 Vol. 59:1
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2. Renewal
Some defenders of payday lending suggest that the problem with
payday loans is not the loans themselves, but how borrowers use
them .65  This position, however, assumes that the industry truly
intends payday loans to be a one-time, short-term product. There is
significant evidence to suggest otherwise.66 While lenders continue to
characterize their products as intended for short-term use, 67 studies
suggest that the reality is quite different. A North Carolina study
showed that more than 50% of payday loan borrowers paid more in
interest and fees than the initial value of the loan .68 The Center for
Responsible Lending (CRL) found that only one percent of loans
involved a single transaction, corroborating other studies which also
found that lenders depend on "chronic borrowing."6 In fact, the CRL
"found that the industry relies almost entirely on revenue from
borrowers caught in a debt trap [and that] ninety-one percent of
payday loans go to borrowers with five or more loan transactions per
year.",70 In addition, the CRL found that 90% of lenders' revenues
come from repeat borrowing. 7'1 The CRL and others have concluded
from such data that the payday loan, despite being sold as a one-time
deal, is in fact "designed to be renewed."7  The incentive for lenders
Social Security, retirement, or disability payments.").
65 See, e.g., Aaron Huckstep, Payday Lending: Do Outrageous Prices Necessarily Mean
Outrageous Profits?, 12 FoRDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 203, 207 (2007) (analogizing payday
loans to taxi service and noting that while the taxi and the payday loans are "cost-effective" for
short-term use, long distance use of the taxi and long-term use of the loans are not). The
presentation of this model suggests that the blame lies on the consumer for expensive misuse of
the service. Id.
66 See KING & PARRISH, supra note 61, at I (noting the comment made by Dan Feehan,
CEO of Cash America, at an industry conference: "[T]he theory in the business is you've got to
get that customer in, work to turm him into a repetitive customer, long-term customer, because
that's really where the profitability is."').
67 Id. (presenting the industry's public description of the purpose of payday loans: ...Since
a payday advance is a short-term solution to an immediate need, it is not intended for repeated
use in carrying an individual from payday to payday. When an immediate need arises, we're
here to help. But a payday advance is not a long-term solution for ongoing budget management.
Repeated or frequent use can create serious financial hardships."' (quoting CMTY. FIN. SERV.
ASS'N, INFORMATION BROCHURE, THE FACTS ABOUT PAYDAY ADANCE SERVICES (2005)));
Huckstep, supra note 65, at 207 (explaining that the payday lending industry's stated purpose is
to provide short-term borrowing options, not long-term loan products).
68 JEAN ANN Fox & EDMUND MIERzwINSKI, CONSUMER FED'N OF Am. & U.S. PUB.
INTEREST RESEARCH GROUP, RENT-A-BANK PAYDAY LENDING 9 (2001), available at
http://www.consumerfed.orgpdfs/paydayreport.pdf.
69 KING ET AL., supra note 13, at 3; see also Chessin, supra note 50, at 411.
70 KINGET AL,supra note 13, at3.
71 Id at 6.
72 Id. at 3; see also Bruch, supra note 60, at 1273-74 (describing the features of payday
loans that prevent borrowers from escaping the obligation); Hellwig, supra note 61 (observing
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to stretch out the loan is significant-the typical borrower ends up
paying back $793 on a $325 loan, and the lender makes $468 over a
period of 4.5 months.7 Other studies verify these significant profit
margins. 7 4
3. Rates
At the root of this trap that keeps borrowers cycling through loan
after loan is the high cost of these loans. Nationally, payday loans
carry an average APR of 470%.75 Even in states like Ohio, where the
statute placed APRs at the low end of the scale relative to other states,
borrowers paid interest and fees in excess of the original loan
principal by the fourth month of indebtedness.7 The industry defends
these rates in two ways. First, the industry argues that APR is not a
fair descriptor of the cost of the loans, and, second, they argue that the
high cost is justified by the proportionately high risk of the customers
served. Both of these defenses are without merit. In fact, the payday
lending business is highly profitable with a typical return on sales of
Industry defenders attack the use of APR rates to describe the cost
of payday loans. APR is irrelevant, they argue, because "the
short-term nature of [payday loans] limits the utility of using APR to
analyze these loans" and "APR emphasis distorts the issue and serves
only to inflame bias against lenders."7 Payday lenders, they say, have
no way to make money from the product if they are limited to lower
fees and rates because of the short term of the loan.7
that the industry's success may be dependant on trapped customers).
73 KING ET AL., supra note 13, at 8.
74 Michael Bertics, Fixing Payday Lending: The Potential of Greater Bank Involvement, 9
N.C. BANKING INST. 133, 136 (2005) (discussing studies showing lenders reap profits of at least
24%, and often much more); JEAN ANN Fox, CONSUMER FED'N OF Am., SAFE HARBOR FOR
USURY: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN PAYDAY LENDING 3-4 (1999), available at
http://www.consumerfed.org/pdfs/safeharbor.pdf (pointing to returns ranging between 22.72
percent and 48 percent). But see Huckstep, supra note 65, at 227 (suggesting lower profit
margins and justifying high fees based on expenses and losses).
75 Fox & MIERZWINsKI, supra note 68, at 4.
76 See ROTHSTEIN & DILLMAN, TRAPPED IN DEBT, supra note 2, at 9 (describing Ohio
APR rates for payday loans as ranging from 367% to 39 1%); see also BAIR, supra note 25, at 3
(describing an APR range from 391% to 572% for payday loans nationwide); KING ET AL.,
supra note 13, at 17 (listing state APRs for payday loans in a range from 196% to 574%, with
most states in high 300% to mid 400% range).
77 Barr, supra note 40, at 153.
78 Amy A. Minnich, Rational Regulation of Payday Lending, 16 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
84, 92 (2006).
79 Id. ("If the fee were limited to 35% annually, as has been suggested, lenders could only
charge $ 1.35 on a two-week loan for $ 100. This fee would not even pay for a store employee to
process the loan.").
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The industry's characterization of payday loans as short term,
however, fails to reflect the reality of the situation. Studies in Ohio
and nationwide have found that the per-person loan volume averages
to 7.4 loans annually per borrower, per store, and 8.7 loans per
borrower across multiple stores.80 Consideration of the fact that many
borrowers use multiple stores tends to indicate that these figures are
conservative-further calculations, based on industry figures, place
the average number of loans per year at 12.6 per borrower."1 When
considered in combination with the standard two-week term for a
loan, this average borrower, through repeat lending, is in debt to the
lender for over six months out of a given year. As described
previously, it is this repeat cycle that not only generates the bulk of
lender profits, but also traps the customer in the loans and results in
fee and interest payments far in excess of the principal over the
average extended loan period .8
The payday lending industry also defends its product by arguing
that its fees are proportional to the risk involved in payday loans. This
high risk, they argue, comes with the territory; borrowers are much
riskier and lack qualifications for other, more mainstream credit
products. The payday loan industry claims that much of its
attractiveness to customers is that customers are not subjected to
credit checks to qualify for a payday loan. In the absence of credit
checks, lenders lack an accurate evaluation of the risk involved for
each individual customer. Instead, they apply the highest-risk cost
structure to every customer and assume that the risk is great. Because
customers self-select for the loans, the range of actual risk involved
can vary greatly. A survey of annual reports of payday lenders in
Colorado conducted by the state revealed that "for the years 1996
through 2004, payday lenders report an average charge-off rate, or
loss experience, of 3.34% of their total loan volume," compared with
rates of 2.69% for consumer loans made by banks and 5.15% for
credit card companies. 83 This loss rate clearly refuites claims by
industry groups that their risk rates are significantly greater than
conventional lending forms.
80 OHIO COALITION FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, supra note 1, at 4-5.
81 Id at 5. "A 2001 industry-commissioned study found that the average payday customer
borrows from 1.7 payday companies annually. (In the past six years the number of storefronts
has more than doubled in Ohio, making the 1.7 figure a conservative current-day estimate)." Id.
Using these figures, the Ohio Coalition for Responsible Lending calculated that "Ohio's actual
repeat borrowing level is 12.6 loans, per borrower, per year, from all lenders." Id.
82 KING ET AL., supra note 13, at 6.
83 Chessin, supra note 50, at 408; see also Barr, supra note 40, at 150 ("The industry
reports gross margins of 301/"~5% of revenue, with losses at 1o/o l.3% of receivables and
return on investment of 24%.").
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Lenders also argue that the cost of the loans is justified not only by
the increased risk that these loans carry", but also by the simple
operational and start-up costs associated with the business model.8
The claim that start-up and loan initiation costs eat up the majority of
lenders' revenues seems somewhat exaggerated when placed next to
figures showing that established stores earn an average of $18.73 per
loan 8 6 and that profit appears to repeat with each renewal. Applied to
the average of 12.6 loans per borrower per year87, this figure shows a
profit of $235.99 over the period of approximately six months
covered by those 12.6 loans. This seems to fit well with the data
provided by the Ohio Coalition for Responsible Lending which
placed the cost of this average loan to the borrower at $637.8
That leaves $401.01 from this typical loan to cover the operating and
initiation costs incurred by the lender, and the remainder, over
one-third of the fees, as profit.
Lender behavior in Ohio suggests that even significant reductions
in the rates and fees charged would still allow for small loans to be
made profitably. After Ohio passed comprehensive legislation in June
2008,8 the payday lending industry launched an aggressive campaign
to overturn the law, claiming that the new 28 percent rate cap will
drive its members out of business.90 At the same time, however, a
large majority of these lenders have already applied for licensing
under House Bill 545, suggesting that they do in fact see a way to
continue operation under the rate cap.91
B. Implementation
1. Market Failure
In addition to the problems explicit in the design of the payday
loan are the problems that stem from the way these loans are
84 Minnich, supra note 78, at 84.
85 Mark Flannery & Katherine Samolyk, Payday Lending: Do the Costs Justify the Price?
2 (FDIC Center for Financial Research Working Paper No. 2005-09), available at
www.fdic.govlbank/analyticallcfr/2005/wp2O05CFRWP2005-09-Flanneryamolyk.pdf
96 Id at 19.
87 OHIO COALITION FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, supra note 1, at 5.
88 Id.
89 H.R. 545, 127th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2007).
90 Jim Siegel, State Bracing for Payday Fight: Well-Funded Lenders Seek Referendum to
Keep High Interest Rate, COLUMBuS DISPATCH, Aug. 8, 2008, at Al. On November 4, 2008,
Ohio voters overwhelmingly favored a ballot measure approving the Ohio Legislature's 28
percent rate cap. Laura Johnston, Voters Keep the Cap on Short-Term Loans at 28 Percent
Mark, THE PLAIN DEALER, November 5, 2008, at X8.
91 Siegel, supra note 90.
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marketed, sold, and collected. When market forces are functioning
properly, economists generally disdain intervention in and regulation
of the markets. Economists recognize that sometimes, however,
markets do not function according to theory. Under those
circumstances, called market failure, intervention is necessary in
order for the markets to function properly and "to ensure fair prices
for consumers." 92 The current payday lending situation is just such a
circumstance. Ohio State Representative William Batchelder, a
conservative proponent of payday lending reform, describes the
dilemma as follows:
I have always been a vocal supporter of free enterprise, and
have opposed needless and burdensome regulation. However,
these abusive practices are a threat to the free markets which
are so critical to our state's prosperity. . .. Adam Smith, the
great prophet of free enterprise, believed there had to be
limitations on interest in order to preserve a free market.
What Smith would think of an APR of 300%, 1 cannot
imagine.9
The payday lending market is a failed market. The primary
problem is that competition has not driven down prcs -ms
lenders operate at the maximum allowable rate 95 and compete with
each other instead through "location of the store, flashy signs,
promises of quick cash, and name recognition. 9  The result is that as
the number of lenders in the market has increased, prices have not
decreased as they ought to in a healthy, functioning market; rather
most lenders charge the maximum permitted by law.97 This is rooted
92 Pearl Chin, Payday Loans: The Case for Federal Legislation, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 723,
741 (2004) (arguing that where supply and demand fail to regulate prices, government
intervention is necessary).
93 Payday Lending Reform Bill, Statehouse Dispatches! Bill's Blog,
http://www.batcheiderforohio.comfblog.cfin?LD=133 (Sept. 14, 2007, 08:38 PM EST); see also
KING & PARRISH, supra note 6 1, at 22.
94 See Chessin, supra note 50, at 408-09 (describing how competition does not determine
prices and how prices instead match up with rate caps); see also Hellwig, supra note 61, at
1584-89 (observing how duress and secrecy regarding pricing have served to drive prices up
and concluding that rate regulation is necessary in this climate of market failure).
95 Chin, supra note 92, at 740-41 (describing how loan prices have failed to drop as the
market has expanded and providing examples of how loan prices adhere closely to state rate
maximums).
96 Bertics, supra note 74, at 143 (discussing the competition tactics of payday lenders that
discourage price shopping by making it difficult and costly for customers to compare
meaningful features of competitive lending products).
97 ROTSTEIN & DILLMAN, CONTINUED GROWTH, supra note 31, at 9 ("[Djespite the large
number of stores, the market for payday lending in Ohio remains uncompetitive regarding prices
of loans, with the vast majority of lenders charging the highest fees and interest rates allowed by
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in information asymmetry and the resulting difficulties and costs that
discourage customers from engaging in price shopping. 9 8 Lenders
then take advantage of a borrower's financial predicament to trap
them in a loan they cannot pay off. This inequality of power is yet
another reason why market failure has occurred.99 It is also a key
reason why well-off individuals and people in stable financial
situations are not flocking to payday lenders in the same numbers as
their less-advantaged counterparts. Consequently, we cannot rely on
typical market forces to solve the problems associated with payday
loans and must resort to regulatory solutions to accomplish the ends
that the market cannot.' 00
2. Abusive Practices
In addition to the structural and design problems associated with
payday loans, there is the additional problem of abusive practices.' 0 '
While observers have been unwilling to brand all lenders as engaging
in such practices, they have documented that such practices represent
the norm, rather than the work of a few bad apples.'02 In a study
conducted in Franklin County, Ohio (the "Ohio Study"), researchers
found "widespread noncompliance with consumer protection laws
and the industry's own self-regulatory guidelines."103 These practices,
which range from plainly illegal to simply deceptive, include:
law."); Bertics, supra note 74, at 142 (discussing payday lending practices and concluding that,
because payday lenders are collecting economic rent in the form of disproportionately high
costs, the payday lending market is imperfect and ordinary market workings are inadequate to
remedy the situation).
98 Bertics, supra note 74. at 143; Chin. supra note 92. at 741-42; Chris Peterson. Failed
Markets, Failing Government, or Both? Learning from the Unintended Consequences of Utah
Consumer Credit Law on Vulnerable Debtors, 2001 UTAH L. REv. 543, 5 73 (200 1).
99 See Scott A. Hefner, Payday Lending in North Carolina: Now You See It, Now You
Don't, I I N.C. BANKING INST. 263,267-68 (2007).
100Peterson, supra note 98, at 573-74.
101 These questionable practices seem not to be confined merely to the regular operation of
the payday lending business. After Ohio passed legislation imposing a strict rate cap in June of
2008, the lenders launched a campaign under the name "Ohioans for Financial Freedom." Mark
Rollenhagen, Cap Repeal Solicitors Misleading, Foes Say, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland, Ohio),
Aug. 13, 2008, at B3. This campaign has allegedly involved a pattern of misinformation,
including representations that the industry's proposed ballot measure is a move to lower interest
rates, rather than a move to override the rate-cap legislation and allow payday lenders to
continue business as usual. Id; see also Siegel, supra note 48, at B2 (describing advertising by
the industry-backed Ohioas for Financial Freedom as less than truthfuil).102 Creola Johnson, Payday Loans: Shrewd Business or Predatory Lending?, 87 NUNN. L.
REV. 1, 5 (2002).
103 Id at 6 (2002).
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[R]efusing to provide customers with basic written
information about the payday loan transaction, giving
consumers false or misleading information about the cost of
credit, failing to advertise the cost of credit using APRs,
refusing to supply customers with written disclosures prior to
contract consummation, claiming no credit check would be
conducted but doing so anyway without obtaining consumer
consent, including clauses in their loan documents that appear
to be illegal or unconscionable, representing that consumers
have the right to rescind the contract at no cost, allowing
consumers to roll over payday loans in violation of state law,
representing to consumers that the lenders have the ability to
collect treble damages from defaulting consumers, and
intimidating consumers with the threat of physical violence
and criminal prosecution.' 0
Anecdotal evidence as well as other studies suggest that these sorts
of practices are by no means confined to the scope of the Ohio Study
and, while not the rule, are certainly the norm in most areas.105 All
these observed practices contribute to the information asymmetries
discussed in the prior section on market failure, and the practices
prevent customers from getting a clear picture of the deal they have
made until it is essentially too late and they see no way out but to
keep taking loans until they can acquire enough money to pay off the
loan and escape.
C Federal Law
The lack of federal involvement in the payday lending arena is not
due to the federal government's inability to regulate such loans. The
emergence of the modem payday loan is rather the direct result of
federal policy choices to forego regulation in favor of allowing
market forces to govern.106 The passage into law of the 2007 Defense
Authorization Bill, which imposed restrictions and a rate cap of 36%
on payday loans offered to military personnel, shows that Congress is
fully able to exert its authority in the matter.'07 The amendment
104 Id at 32-33 (footnotes omitted).
105 ROTHSTEIN & DILLMAN, CONTINUED GROWTH, supra note 3 1, at 9 ("[S]tore employees
were not able to explain to the testers what the annual percentage rate meant."); Kelly J. Noyes,
Get Cash Until Payday! The Payday-Loan Problem in Wisconsin, 2006 Wis. L. Ray. 1627,
1638-39 (2006) (describing coercive collection practices used even when prohibited).
106 See DAN IMMERGLUCK, CREDIT TO THE COMMUNITY: COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT
AND FAIR LENDING POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 10 (2004).
107 John Warer National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, Pub. L. No.
109-364, § 670, 120 Stat. 2083, 2266-69 (codified as 10 U.S.C. § 987 (2006)).
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containing this rate cap was passed in response to widespread
observations that lenders were specifically targeting and regularly
taking advantage of military personnel.10 8 In addition, federal banking
agencies have slowly increased their regulation of bank funding of
and rate-renting to payday loan operations.' 09 Still, the federal
government has failed to act in any comprehensive way, such as
extending the protections given to military personnel to all Americans
with a federal rate cap statute.' I1
The federal government's failure to deal with payday lending on a
broad scale is the result of distinct policy choices based on an
ideology that favors market action over reuain" Even when
these choices were made, regulators realized that a move away from
regulation to market forces brought "the potential for greater risk and
greater uncertainties" and that market forces were incapable of
providing the safeguards necessary to protect the financial system
from "new and perhaps even unforeseen problems."" 2
The market ideology won out, however, with the passage of the
Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of
1980, which made significant strides in deregulating the banking
industry and in pre-empting state usury laws in the name of
competition and efficiency.'" 3 This active choice to eschew regulation
is a key cause of the current payday loan predicament.""1 Admittedly,
108 Graves & Peterson, supra note 25, at 659 ("[Tlhere is irrefutable geographic evidence
demonstrating that payday lenders are actively and aggressively targeting U.S. military
personnel."); KING ET AL., supra note 13, at 13.
109 See KING & PARRISH, supra note 6 1, at 6 (describing how the FDIC's action in 2005
closed the last opportunity for payday lenders to operate under the "rent-a-charter" model,
whereby lenders partnered with banks located in states without strong payday lending limits and
then took advantage of the ability of those banks to export their rates to continue to charge high
rates in states that had enacted rate limitations on payday lending products); FDIC, Financial
Institution Letter FIL-14-2005, Payday Lending Programs Revised Examination Guidance
(Mar. 1, 2005), available at http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/financial/2005/fill4O5.pdf
(providing the final regulatory cut-off for banks involved in rate exportation "rent-a-charter"
partnerships with payday lenders). The FDIC's action significantly increased states' abilities to
ban payday lending and high interest rates within their borders without those efforts being
undermined by rate structures imported from other less restrictive states. KING & PARRISH,
supra note 61, at 6.
10 See 10 U.S.C. § 987 (2006).
1"'See E. GERALD CORRIGAN, FEDERAL RESERvE BANK OF MINNEAPOLIS, 1980 ANNUAL
REPORT ESSAY: A NEW LAW, A NEW ERA 1, 4-7 (1980), available at http://nminneapolisfed.org/
pubs/ar/ar1 980.cfm (describing greater competition and less regulation as primary goals of The
Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980).
112 CORRI1GAN, supra note Ill1, at 7, 5.
113 Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, Pub. L. No.
96-221, 94 Stat. 132 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C and 15 U.S.C.).
114 Foremost among the reasons attributed to the rise of payday lending is the deregulation
of the banking industry. As was intended, banks moved away from small loan products towards
more profitable products in the atmosphere of increased competition created by deregulation.
CORRIGAN, supra note Ill1, at 4-5 (describing the market theory behind deregulation and
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the true roots of payday lending lie far deeper, in features of the
human condition that are unlikely to be changed easily, if at all. The
first of these features is poverty in all its forms. Poverty and need
present the opportunity for the payday loan, which offers quick cash
to those who do not have it and minimal up-front complication.
Where there is such need, there will also be someone willing to
exploit it. The opportunity for profits is simply too good for some to
pass on. These causes are enormous problems in and of themselves,
and they are not so easily changed. The policy choice to eschew
regulation, however, is susceptible to change, and presents the most
realistic and clear path to effectively and definitively eliminating not
only the problems of payday loans, but also whatever exploitative
form attempts to supplant them. A bit of hope for such change exists
in the fact that deregulationist ideology is no longer as unassailable as
it once was. In the wake of recent financial upheaval triggered by the
mortgage lending collapse, some strong proponents of deregulation
have come to admit not only that "the deregulation .. . of banking has
been a factor in the current credit crisis," but that, in retrospect,
deregulation may be at the root of many of the nation's recent
crises. 115
D. State Law
In the absence of any meaningful federal action, states have
addressed payday lending in their own ways. The range of responses
has varied greatly, but the result has been that the majority of states
permit, and even encourage, payday lending within their borders.
States have taken a variety of approaches to payday lending, and
while no two approaches are identical, they can be categorized into a
few general categories: explicit toleration,' 16  under-enforced
prohibition,' 17 true prohibition,118 and direct prohibition.
anticipating the effects of federal banking deregulation); Barr, supra note 40, at 152 (attributing
payday lending's rise to the deregulation of the banking industry and to the resulting increase in
competition that led banks to cut less profitable products such as small value consumer loans);
see also Huckstep, supra note 65, at 205 (crediting banking deregulation in the 1980s as playing
a role in enabling the rise of payday lending); Schaaf, supra note 53, at 340 n.8 (describing how
banking deregulation led banks to eliminate services, including small unsecured loans).
115 Posting of Richard Posner to The Becker-Posner Blog, http://www.becker-posner-
blog.cornlarchives/2008f04/reregulate fina.html (Apr. 28, 2008, 12:35 PM). Alan Greenspan
has also recently acknowledged flaws in his free-market ideology and admitted that deregulation
of financial markets was in some respects an error. Edmund L. Andrews, Greenspan Concedes
Flaws in Deregulatory Approach, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2008, at B 1.
116 RoadJ. Mann & Jim Hawkins, Just Until Payday, 54 UCLA L. REV. 855, 874 (2007).
117Id. at 877.
118Id. at 879.
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Explicit toleration is the most common state approach and is
generally characterized by state statutes that specifically authorize
lenders to engage in the practice of making payday loans."19 Most of
these statutes are based on model legislation created by the
Community Financial Services Association (CFSA), a payday
lending industry trade group.120 The model legislation provides that
"[loans can only be made for $500 or less; loans can only be renewed
one time; borrowers can rescind a loan within a day; lenders must
obtain licenses to operate; lenders cannot use threats of criminal
prosecution as a collection tool; and. ... fees are capped at 20 percent
of the first $300 lent and 7.5 percent of any funds lent over $300." 121
Ohio followed a variation of this approach beginning in 1995. 122
The second most common state approach, under-enforced
prohibition, is characterized by "a formal prohibition of payday
lending, coupled with a lack of resources or effort adequate to make
the prohibition effective."' 2 3 The states taking this approach have
generally left usury laws in place without making provisions for
payday lending, but have been unable or unwilling to use these
existing laws to effectively curb payday lending activity.124 Texas
typifies this approach: while Texas law caps interest rates at 24
percent and limits fee structures such that maximum fees are
approximately one-third of the typical fees for payday loans, lenders
have found ways to avoid these limits, and payday lending continues
to exist in Texas as in states with permissive regulatory approaches.125
Some states, in particular New York, have taken the approach
described as true prohibition.126 New York has preserved strict usury
limits and coupled these limits with strict enforcement by the attorney
general's office, with the result that no major payday lenders have
established a foothold within the state.'127 The effective difference
between true prohibition and that of under-enforced prohibition lies at
least as much in enforcement practices as in the law.' 28 This suggests
119Id at 874.
1201d. at 874-75.
121 Id. (footnotes omitted).
122 OHio REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1315.35-44 (WAest 2004 & Supp. 2008) (repealed Sept. 1,
2008); H.R. 313, 12 1 st Gen. Assent., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 1995); see supra Part IL.A (discussing the
basic elements of Ohio's payday loan laws).
123 Mann & Hawkins, supra note 116, at 877.
125 Id. at 878-79. See also Deena Reynolds, A Look at Payday Loans & Current Regulation
in Texas, 8 TEX. TECH. ADMIN. L.J. 321, 339-40 (2007) (concluding that Texas' approach to
regulating payday lending has failed).
126 Mann & Hawkins. supra note 116. at 879.
127 Id. at 880.
128 Id ("The difference, it seems, is not in the usury limit but in the ability of regulators to
bring and prevail in litigation to enforce those limits.").
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that states willing to devote the effort and attention to keeping payday
lending out of their jurisdictions can enjoy significant success-so
long as they never allow payday lending to establish a foothold.
For states that have bowed to the payday lending industry and
adopted the explicit toleration approach, the opportunity for true
prohibition has passed. These, states, if they wish to eradicate an
established payday lending presence, must deal directly with the
issue. North Carolina and Georgia are the two states that have so far
taken this approach, though not without facing some resistance.12
Both states enacted tough rules coupled with aggressive
enforcement.130 This type of solution is the only effective way to
eliminate payday lending and free borrowers from the debt trap.)3 '
The latest CR1. study, which analyzed the effectiveness of the various
restrictions used to curb payday lending, concluded that rate caps on
small loans are the only measure that can provide consumers access to
affordable credit without abusive consequences.132 In reaching this
conclusion, the authors evaluated the effects of renewal bans and
other attempts at mitigating the effects of payday loans. Limits on the
number of outstanding loans, payment plan options, income-based
loan amount limits, databases used for enforcement, and statutes
aimed narrowly at the current form of payday loan all failed to stop
lenders from "trapping borrowers in long-term debt." 13 3 According to
the CRL, only states "which enforce a comprehensive interest rate
cap at or around 36 percent for consumer loans [in general] have
solved their debt trap problem."'134 The viability of these interest rate
129 KING ET AL., supra note 13, at 5. More recently, the District of Columbia has also
joined this grouping with legislation capping interest rates at 24 percent going into effect in
January 2008. Jordan Weissman, Credit Unions Slowly Fill Void as Payday Lenders Leave
D.C-, WASH. POST, July 26, 2008, at DI. Ohio is following along the sanme path, passing a 28
percent cap in June 2008 to go into effect in September 2008. Jim Siegel, Interest-Rate Cap of
28%. COLUMBUS DISPATCH, June 3. 2008. at Bl; Press Release, Ctr. for Responsible
Lending, Families Save Billions as Ohio Joins 14 States and DC in Rejecting Predatory Payday
Lending (June 2, 2008), available at http://www.responsiblelending.org/press/releases/trap-is-
sprung-in-the-buckeye-state.html. The Center for Responsible Lending now recognizes fifteen
states plus the District of Columbia as having rejected payday lending, including recent
additions of Arkansas, New Hampshire, and Oregon. Id.
130 See Hefier, supra note 99, at 264-65 (suggesting that North Carolina and Georgia have
taken substantial steps to eliminate the rent-a-charter business by payday lending shops).
"I1 This is true not only for states that have previously allowed payday loans, but also for
states that have successfully kept out payday loans through existing and enforced usury limits
and rate caps. The only difference is that newly enacted bans eliminate payday loans, while
existing rate caps kept them out in the first place.
132 KING & PARRISH, supra note 6 1, at 19.
133 Id. at 12-18.
134Id. at 19 (explaining that Connecticut, the District ot Columbia, Georgia, Maine,
Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York,'North Carolina, Oregon, Pennsylvania,
Vermont, and West Virginia have all achieved success through enforcing interest rate caps).
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caps has increased significantly in the wake of the effective end of
rent-a-charter agreements with out of state banks.' 35
IV. ASSESSING THE PROBLEM
A. Goals
The North Carolina ban on payday lending and its relative success
has brought to light a few issues worthy of consideration. In the wake
of the ban, researches have noticed two significant changes. First,
with the enactment of a comprehensive rate cap, payday lending as
we know it has ceased to exist in North Carolina.136 Second, the
disaster predicted by payday lending advocates was avoided. Payday
lenders and their supporters often argue that bans on payday lending
will leave borrowers who cannot access mainstream credit with
nowhere to turn. 137 However, "small loans from consumer finance
companies, credit unions, and other financial institutions have
flourished while charging rates at or below the rate cap."13 8 The same
has happened in the District of Columbia in the wake of an early 2008
interest rate cap, where credit unions have moved to offer small-dollar
loans with reasonable rates and longer repayment terms.393 The
borrowers who previously used payday loans have found other, more
economical alternatives.140  These observations highlight the
13
5 See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
1
3 6 KING & PARRISH, supra note 6 1, at 6 (explaining that payday lenders exited North
Carolina in the wake of the rate cap and the end of lender partnerships with out of state FDIC
insured banks).
138Id. at 20-21 (explaining that several new lending products have developed which
operate within the rate cap and still are profitable for lenders).
1
3 9 See Jordan Weissman, Credit Unions Slowly Fill Void As Payday Lenders Leave D. C.,
WASH. POST. July 26. 2008. at DI (acknowledging, however, that some borrowers have also
crossed the border into Virginia or looked to the Internet for payday loans).
140See UNC CTR. FOR CMTY. CAPITAL, NORTH CAROLINA CONSUMERS AFTER PAYDAY
LENDING (2007), available at http://www.ccc.unc.edu/documents/NCAfter -Payday.pdf
(noting that consumers are better off in the absence of payday lending). fut see DONALD P.
MORGAN & MICHAEL R. STRAIN, FED. RES. BANK OF N.Y., PAYDAY HOLIDAY: How
HOUSEHOLDS FARE AFTER PAYDAY CREDIT BANS (2007), http://www.newyorkfed.orgl
research/staff__reports/sr309.pdf (arguing that payday loan bans have actually harmed
consumers); Cmty. Fin. Serv. Ass'n of Am., Survey by University of North Carolina Finds
Consumers Face Costly Short-term Credit Choices Since Payday Loans Exited the State (2007),
http://www.cfsa.nevL/UNC.htm. Consumer advocates, however, have defended the bans with
responses to Morgan and the payday lending industry. See Press Release, UIJC Ctr. for
Cmty. Capital, Response to Payday Industry Misrepresentation of Study Findings (Dec. 4,
2007), available at http://www.ccc.unc.edu/documents/ResponseToCFSA.pdf; Ctr. for
Responsible Lending, CRL Critique of "Payday Holiday: How Households Fare After Payday
Credit Bans" by Donald P. Morgan and Michael R. Strain (Rev. Jan. 2008),
http://www.responsiblelending.org/pdfs/cri-morgan-critique- 12- 1 0.pdf.
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necessarily two-part goal for opponents of payday lending. First,
payday lending must be banned; second, consumers must have fair
and effective alternatives. These alternatives are necessary for two
reasons. First, without alternatives, the predictions of the payday loan
industry that consumers will lack credit options may come true.
Second, in the absence of good alternatives, the lending market could
go underground, or new lending forms may emerge on the margins of
the law,'14' just as payday loans themselves did in the 1990S. 142
B. Hercules and the Hydra
In ancient Greek mythology, the second labor of Hercules was to
slay the Lernaean Hydra.14 3 The Hydra was a huge creature with nine
heads that primarily occupied itself by "go[ing] forth into the plain
and ravag~ing] both the cattle and the country." 1"4 The Hydra's
strength lay in the fact that each time one of its many heads was cut
off or smashed, two would grow back in its place, rendering the
creature even more dangerous than before. 14' Hercules was able to
slay the Hydra only with the help of his companion, "lolaus who, by
setting fire to a piece of the neighbouring wood and burning the roots
of the heads with the brands, prevented them from sprouting." 4
Hercules was thus able to slay the Hydra's eight mortal heads; the
ninth, immortal head he severed and buried beneath a rock.14 7
The story of Hercules and the Hydra illustrates the payday lending
dilemma.148 The many heads of the Hydra are the various forms of
short-term high cost lending. When one form is banned or restricted,
new forms emerge to take its place, just as the Hydra's heads grew
141 See, e.g., Hefier, supra note 99, at 272 (describing how new, disguised forms of
lending arose in North Carolina following the expiration of the authorizing statute on payday
lending in 2001); Mary Spector, Taming the Beast: Payday Loans, Regulatory Efforts, and
Unintended Consequences, 57 DEPAUL L. REv. 961, 983-95 (2008) (describing in detail how
payday lenders are reorganizing as credit service organizations ("CSOs") to avoid rate
regulation); Jeremy LaMarche, Comment, Payday Lenders Under Attack, Seek Protection in
Cyberspace, 19 LOY. CONSUMER L. REv. 218 (2007) (explaining how payday lenders have
moved to new schemes on the Internet as states have developed more restrictive approaches to
payday lending).
142 See Huckstep, supra note 65, at 204-05 (attributing the emergence of early 20th century
salary loans and modem payday loans to a lack of alternatives for people with short-term cash
flow problems).
143 2 APOLLODORUS, THE LIBRARY 187 (James George Frazer, trans., G.P. Putnam's Sons
1921).
144 1d, at 187-89.
145 Id. at 189.
146Id.
1
4 7 Id.
148 After this Note was written, but prior to its publication, another author recognized the
value of the Hydra analogy and used it to illustrate that, "like the mythical beast Hydra, the
payday loan is resistant to attempts to tame it."' Spector, supra note 14 1, at 962.
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back two-fold. The immortal head, which drives the re-growth,
represents the root causes of the payday loan, poverty and greed,
which will continue to exist even if the rest of the monster is slain.149
As Hercules found when he battled the Hydra, simply destroying
one of the heads was not enough to kill the beast; in fact his efforts
initially left the Hydra with more heads-making it even more
dangerous. Such is the danger with attacks on payday loans that seek
only to ban those loans. Merely cutting off the head (banning the
loans) is not enough, for new forms will arise to take its place. Only
when lolaus discovered a way to keep the heads from growing back
was Hercules able to gain an advantage over the Hydra. Similarly, in
order to solve the payday loan problem, something more than just a
ban is necessary. This is a process well documented in history.
C. The Historical Cycle
The payday loan and its modem compatriots are in no way new
features on the American landscape; in fact, their roots go back much
farther, to the very roots of exchangeable currency.' 50 Not only is the
loan type recurring, but the loan's life cycle follows a recurring
pattern. The basic cycle begins with the emergence of a new form of
lending product. While the form is new, the basic concept is the same:
the loan is short-term, for a relatively small amount of money, has a
high cost, and is aimed at people lacking adequate access to more
formalized credit. After its debut, this new loan spreads and grows.
After some time, as more and more people find themselves trapped,
harmed, or disadvantaged in some way by the loan, public outcry
leads to an examination of the loans. In reaction to this outcry,
lawmakers then ban or severely restrict the practice. This ban or
restriction is the equivalent of Hercules crushing or cutting off one of
the Hydra's heads.
The underlying circumstances that led to the form's growth
remain, however. The immortal head of the Hydra carries on, and
without additional action, more heads sprout in the place of those
destroyed. In the void left by the eradication of its predecessor, a new
form begins to develop, and the cycle repeats itself.'5' As with attacks
141 It is worth noting that Hercules never actually killed the Hydra; its ninth head was
immortal. Id This situation is mirrored by the payday loan dilemma, where the heart of the
problem is likewise incapable of being eliminated completely. See supra Part III.C (discussing
poverty and greed as the deepest roots of payday lending).
'
5 0 See SIDNEY HOMER & RICHARD SYLLA, A HISTORY OF INTEREST RATES, 25-31 (3d ed.
1991).
151 See Michael Kenneth, Payday Lending: Can "Reputable" Banks End Cycles of Debt?,
42 U.S.F. L. REv. 659, 712 (2008).
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on the Hydra, the greatest danger is that as new forms return, they
often have greater complexity and variety. Where before there was
one head, now there are two. Consequently, a solely prohibitory
reaction to high-rate lending is at best a temporary solution, and at
worst provides a catalyst for even worse practices to emerge. 512 This
very argument is a favorite of some who favor retaining payday
lending.113
This historical cycle is further illustrated by two additional
examples from different eras.'514 The first such instance occurred in
the middle ages in Europe.15 5 Despite the Catholic Church's general
prohibition on usury, different sorts of lending proliferated under
various exceptions;156 by the fifteenth century, usurious lending was
frowned upon yet tolerated as a "necessary evil."' 57 Interest rates for
small loans in that era, often made by pawnshops, ranged from 32.5%
to 300%, while unsecured loans from medieval loan sharks were often
as high as 1300% yearly.' 58 General objections to usurious lending
grew into concrete efforts by governmental institutions to not only
ban manifest usury, but to create public institutions to provide
alternative sources of credit at significantly lower rates in the range of
six to ten percent.15 9 These new institutions were called "mons
pietatis" and functioned as a sort of "public pawnshop financed by
charitable donations and run for the benefit of the poor." 6 As these
institutions grew, they evolved into bank-like institutions and began
to lend to people other than the poor.'16 ' This series of events not only
fits the general model of loan, objection, and ban, but also went one
step further towards providing an alternative. The alternative was a
necessary part of the solution, however; prior to the mons pietatis,
efforts to curb usury had been limited in effectiveness.162
152 Mann & Hawkins, supra note 116, at 886-88 (explaining that bans on payday lending
may expose borrowers to even worse options).
153 Id. at 859 ("[The prohibition of payday lending would only lead to a shift of lending
activity-borrowers will continue to borrow but will do so using products that are more harmful
than payday loans").
15 Tes examples are by no means exclusive; many other eras have had their own version
of the payday loan. See, e.g., Spector, supra note 14 1, at 969-75 (describing several historical
instances of usurious small loans).
15 HOMER & SYLLA, supra note 150, at 77-79.
156 See generally id at 69-74 (describing the concept of usury in the middle ages).
M Id. at 78.
158 Id. at 72.
1591d. at 78-79.
160d. at 79.
161 Id.
162 See, e.g., Spector, supra note 141, at 969-70 (noting how twelfth century lenders were
able to evade prohibitions against usury).
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A more recent version of the cycle occurred in the United States in
the early twentieth century as a form of salary selling. Described as
the work of "[tlhe better class of modem loan shark[s]," the practice
of salary selling involved a worker taking a loan a week before his
paycheck and then repaying the loan by handing over the paycheck
when it arrived.16 3 This type of loan was generally targeted at the
"emerging lower middle class of urban American society," which
lacked access to more mainstream credit sources and who often faced
needs that exceeded their finances.'64 The favored rate for the small
loan was the "five for six," where a worker would borrow five dollars
at the beginning of the week to be repaid, plus one dollar, at the end
of the week. 165 Depending on the term, these loans carried interest
rates ranging from 520% to 1040%. 166 The news media played a role
in publicizing the predicament that many borrowers found themselves
in, as did nonprofit organizations and even courts.' 67 This type of
salary loan was outlawed and disappeared as states adopted the
Uniform Small Loan Laws and passed usury statutes. 168 Changing
economic circumstances allowed this approach, which depended on
reputable lenders filling the need previously met by salary lenders, to
achieve relative success for a time.'169
The modem payday loan has followed the same path as its
predecessors. We are currently in the outcry stage, about to break into
the post-payday loan era. At this point, having generally commnitted to
do something to curtail payday lending,' 70 we face a crucial choice:
do we want to fall into the same cycle and see new forms arise to
replace payday loans, or do we want to break the cycle? The approach
of this Note from this point forward assumes the latter.
163 Id. at 428; Bruch, supra note 60, at 1267-68; Graves & Peterson, supra note 25, at 669-
70.
1 64Graves & Peterson, supra note 25, at 670.
165 HOMER & SYLLA, supra note 150, at 428; Bruch, supra note 60, at 1267; Graves &
Peterson, supra note 25, at 670.
16 HME & SYLLA, supra note 150, at 428; Graves & Peterson, supra note 25, at 670; see
also Bruch, supra note 60, at 1268 (describing interest rates of 270% to 955% for similar
schemes).
167 Graves & Peterson, supra note 25, at 670-72.
168Bruch, supra note 60, at 1268; Graves & Peterson, supra note 25, at 672.
169 Graves & Peterson, supra note 25, at 672. The success lasted as long as govenment
regulation reigned in banks' profit motive; after deregulation in the 1980s opened up the market,
reputable lenders quickly abandoned these small loans in favor of more profitable products. See
supra Part IIIB (discussion on deregulation and federal policy).
170 See Hefner, supra note 99, at 270-71 (noting the general trend towards curtailing
payday loans at both state and federal levels).
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V. SOLVING THE PROBLEM
A. Rate Cap
The first step in ending payday loans is to impose a rate cap. So
far, several states have successfully taken this approach. A state-by-
state solution is not enough, however. The federal government is
responsible for deregulating the financial sector and for allowing the
the payday loan monster to emerge; consequently, the federal
government must also be responsible for solving the problem. The
rate cap at 36% for military personnel 17 1 is a first step; all that remains
is for Congress to extend those protections to the rest of the country.
Otherwise, lenders will continue to find new ways to subvert state
regulatory schemes and the Hydra will live o.172
B. Alternatives
As suggested by the story of Hercules and the Hydra, the payday
lending situation requires something more than just a rate cap if a
long-term solution is desired. This something more is a viable
alternative to meet the demand and to fill the void left by the
cessation of payday lending after rate caps or bans are
implemented.173
1. Bankcs
Mainstream banking institutions are best suited to provide
alternatives to payday lending.' 74 Prior to deregulation, banks played
171 John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, Pub. L. No.
109-364, § 670, 120 Stat. 2083, 2266 (codified as 10 U.S.G.S. § 987 (2006)).
172 See Hefner, supra note 99, at 272-73 (describing ways in which lenders attempted to
subvert North Carolina law after the expiration of the payday loan authorizing statute in 200 1);
LaMarche, supra note 14 1, at 221-22 (discussing how lenders have moved towards
Internet-based operations as states have begun to restrict traditional payday lending operations);
Spector, supra note 141, at 962-63 (describing how payday lenders are reorganizing as CSOs to
subvert new rate regulation); Weissman, supra note 139 (observing that as payday lenders have
departed, some borrowers have crossed state lines or turned to the Internet for loans).
173 See supra Part IV.A (discussing goals).
174 Inthe following sections, the term "bank" is used loosely to describe banks and other
mainstream lending institutions of like character. Credit unions are considered separately, for
while credit unions have been instrumental in developing alternatives in some cases, they are
inherently limited by the common bond membership feature, which means credit union products
will be inherently limited to serving a restricted subset of the population, see NAT'L CREDIT
UNION ADMIN., FACTS ABOUT FEDERAL CREDIT UNIONS (2007), http://www.ncua.gov/
Publications/brochuresfFCUFacts/FactFedCreditUnion A2.pdf (describing common bond
limitation on membership). Still, credit unions can play an important role when prospective
borrowers are members or qualify for membership. Credit unions with community charters, for
instance, are able to reach a broader population than traditional forms. See Weissman, supra
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a far more active role in the small consumer loan market than they do
currently. Bank departure from this market helped to create the credit
void that payday lending developed to fill.'175 A return to the small
consumer loan market is certainly not an alien role for banks. More
importantly, though, banks are particularly suited to reach out to
payday loan customers, because they already have a relationship with
these individuals-one of the basic requirements for a typical payday
loan is that the borrower has a checking account. 176  These
already-existing relationships not only can make it easy for banks to
market payday loan alternatives, but they also have the potential to
reduce bank costs ordinarily associated with bringing new customers
into the systems. In addition to already having relationships with the
relevant population, banks also have the necessary resources and
infrastructure to implement payday loan alternatives effectively and
efficiently.17 7
Banks are also subject to forces which suggest that they are not
only capable of providing alternatives, but that they are well-suited to
ensuring that those alternatives are fair and helpful to borrowers.
Banks have reputational concerns that play a significant role in
constraining their behavior and keeping them from engaging in
practices that could reflect badly on their images. 17 8
Additionally, banks can benefit substantially from providing
payday loan alternative products. Various credit union and alternative
provider programs have shown that small value short-term loans can
be provided at fair rates and can still generate profits for the
note 139.
175 See supra Part III.B (discussion on deregulation and federal policy). But see Mann &
Hawkins, supra note 116, at 889 ("[Blefore consumer credit was deregulated in the United
States, banks would not make small, unsecured, high-risk loans to borrowers because of the high
transaction costs associated with such loans."). The present lack of widely-available alternatives
is a point raised by industry defenders in response to rate caps and bans. In an article discussing
a lender-backed campaign to repeal Ohio's new rate cap, Kim Norris, an industry spokesperson,
is quoted as saying that borrowers ...can't go to a bank and get a $100 loan. No bank offers it."'
Siegel, supra note 90. Bank entry solves this problem.
176 Payday loan customers are not the un-banked, but the under-banked. See BAIR, supra
note 25, at 10; Barr, supra note 40, at 153.
'1' BAlk, supra note 25, at 28; William J. Clinton & Arnold Schwarzenegger, Op-Ed.,
Beyond Payday Loans, WALL ST. J., Jan. 24, 2008, at A 17 ("[M]ore that 90% of non-bank
alternatives [such as payday lenders] are located within one mile of a bank or credit union
branch.").
178 BAIR, supra note 25, at 10 (stating that banks are concerned about activity that might
"invit[e] criticism from media, public policy officials, and consumer advocates"); Bertics, supra
note 74, at 156-57. While reputational risk has been a deterrent to banks considering entry into
the payday lending market, it also holds the potential to serve as a check on banks once they
become involved in alternative products.
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lenders.'17 9  Banks can also benefit from an expanded customer
base and from customers who are able to build wealth through
fairly-priced credit and thereby enter the financial mainstream. 80
Banks have an incentive to see customers work their way towards
financial stability in a way that payday lenders do not-banks
generally do well when their customers do well, 18 1 while payday
lenders do well when their customers do not.'182
A final reason why banks are particularly suitable to the role of
providing affordable alternatives to payday loans is because banks, as
part of a regulated industry, have an ongoing responsibility to serve
the public good.'183 The following sections explore this responsibility
in ever-increasing phases, from what banks want to do, to what banks
can be incentivized to do, and finally to what banks must be required
to do. Taking on the role of providing affordable payday loan
alternatives falls into this final phase.
2. Voluntary Bank Entry
Having concluded that existing banking institutions are well-suited
to provide payday loan alternatives, the next question that arises is
how such institutions move into that role. There are three different
approaches to bringing banks into the role of providing alternatives to
payday loans. The least interventionist solution is for voluntary bank
entry.'184 Under this approach, the rate cap is the end of government
action; beyond that, anyone may or may not move to fill the
post-payday loan void, provided of course that they fall within the
limits of the rate cap itself and other laws.'185 This model, where
179 Matt Cart, CUs to Fill Payday Gap? Maybe, Am. BANKER (New York), Nov. 7, 2007,
at 1; see also BAIR, supra note 25, at 21-27 (describing case studies of several payday loan
alternative lending programs and noting how several of these programs have been profitable for
the lenders despite high-risk borrowers and low interest rates and fees). But see Weissman,
supra note 139 (noting that some credit unions do not make money on small dollar loans, but
see them instead as a way to introduce new members to more mainstream products).
180 See Clinton & Schwarzenegger, supra note 177 (suggesting that fair lending products
can help to grow the economy and bring new customers into the financial mainstream).
181 While some bank products, such as overdraft protection products, do take advantage of
customers' financial troubles, banks usually are served better by solvent and prosperous
customers, who are better able to pay off loans and make use of a greater variety of bank
products and services. Infra notes 197-99 and accompanying text.
182 See supra Part III.A.2 (discussing how payday lending profits depend on repeated use
of loans, which in turn depends on the inability to pay the loan off and escape the cycle of debt).
183 See infra Part V.B3.4.
184 This approach is advocated by a recent article, which recognizes that regulatory and
public image pressures, as well as financial and institutional resources make banks excellent
candidates for providing payday loan replacements. The author takes the position that banks
"should be 'invited' to take over the industry." Kenneth, supra note 15 1, at 662.
185 Variations on this type of approach have been touted as part of a payday loan solution
by a variety of authors. See, e.g., OHIO COALITION FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, supra note 1, at
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implemented, has not been unsuccessful. In North Carolina, for
instance, the North Carolina State Employees Credit Union
(NC SECU) Salary Advance Loan provides interest rates of 12% on
short-term loans and incorporates a mandatory savings component
aimed at building a financial cushion for borrowers to lessen the need
for a loan in the first place. 186 In addition, recent studies show that
borrowers facing financial shortfalls used a variety of sources to help
them cope; the absence of payday lending did not significantly affect
their ability to get through financial emergencies. 18 7
The emergence of a fair alternative and the continuing ability of
people to meet financial shortfalls seem at first to satisfy the criteria
for success. 18 8 The problem, however, is not only that alternatives
such as that provided by the NCSECU lie in the hand of the market,
but also that the NCSECU product, specifically, is significantly
limited in the population to whom it is available.189 In this case,
Hercules and lolaus have not fully slain the Hydra; rather they have
left the finishing of the job to anyone who happens to pass by. In
North Carolina, the first passerby happened to be well-suited to the
task, and was able to keep some of the Hydra's heads from coming
back. However, this localized achievement should not be mistaken for
a complete solution. NCSECU's program, as good as it may be, is not
only subject to market forces, 190 but is severely limited by the nature
of credit unions and membership requirements.'191 Despite the initial
positive results in North Carolina, this solution of allowing the market
to fill the void is not nearly enough to ensure the availability of
fair and effective alternatives to payday lending. The funldamental
problem with allowing a market-based solution is that such an
approach is what created the payday loan in the first place.19 2
9; Bertics, supra note 74, at 149; Hefner, supra note 99, at 287; Mann & Hawkins, supra note
116, at 905-07.
186 BAIR, supra note 25, at 21-22; KING & PARRISH, supra note 6 1, at 20. See also BAIR,
supra note 25, at 22-26 (describing case studies of several other alternative programs in various
states).
187 UNC CTR. FOR CMTY. CAPITAL, supra note 140, at 4-6.
188 See supra Part IV.A (discussing goals, in particular the goal of maintaining borrower
options).
189 See supra note 163 (discussing limitations of credit unions).
190If the loan product is not profitable, continuation is highly unlikely, even for a credit
union. See NAT'L CREDIT UNION ADMIN, supra note 171 (describing the emphasis on service
rather than profit and the cooperative nature of credit unions).
191 See supra note 174 (discussing limitations of credit unions).
192 Granted, the environment of deregulation from which the payday loan arose did not
provide for strict rate caps, as are present in the post-payday loan environment. While the rebirth
of rate caps surely limits the ability of lenders to escalate rates into triple-digit APRs, the
creativity that is likely to result from an otherwise open field is more than likely to be channeled
154 Vol. 59:1
2008] PA YDA Y LOAN SOL UTIONS15
Relying on the market to fix the problem not only invites further
failure,193 but is unlikely to involve the institutions best suited to
provide a workable alternative to payday loans-banks. Despite being
well-suited to the task, there are many reasons why banks have been
reluctant to enter this market on their own.'19 4 This reluctance is rooted
in concerns about profitability, reputational risk, and a perception,
based on regulatory agency approaches to rent-a-charter agreements
with payday lenders, that regulators disfavor such activity.1'9 Banks
have also responded to the collapse of the subprime market and the
related financial crisis by reigning in credit across the board. 196 This
newfound caution and increasingly risk-averse lending practices
will likely increase banks' reluctance to offer new products to
customers perceived as high-risk. Even more importantly, banks will
be reluctant to create low-cost, small dollar credit products because of
the threat such products pose to bank profits from existing overdraft
protection products.197  These products, characterized as services
rather than as a form of credit to avoid falling under the Truth In
Lending Act,' 98 can be even more expensive than payday loans. This
high cost yields high profits; overdraft protection products represent a
significant source of profits for banks that offer the service. 199 Despite
their ongoing obligation to serve the public good, it is unreasonable to
expect most banks to forego this income to offer low-cost, short-term,
small-dollar consumer loans, especially considering the additional
deterrents provided by concerns about profitability, reputation, and
regulatory hostility.
towards increasing profits for lenders rather than towards helping out low to middle income
borrowers experiencing financial shortfalls.
193 See supra Part IIB. 1 (discussing market failure); supra Part II13 (discussing reasons
for the birth of payeay loans); supra Part 1II.C (describing federal deregulation policy choice).
114See BAIR, supra note 25, at 10.
195 Id. See also Bertics, supra note 74, at 153.
19 6 Sudeep Reddy, US. News: More Banks Tighten Lending Standards, WALL ST. J., Aug.
12, 2008, at A3. Banks must realize, though, that their own practices may significantly heighten
the risk of loans made to risky customers. When banks offer fair products at reasonable rates to
low- and moderate-income borrowers, that risk can be managed into profit for the bank and
financial stability for the borrower. See, e.g., Theresa Dixon Murphy, Third Federal's Quarterly
Profit up 19 Percent, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland, Ohio), Feb. 12, 2008, at Cl (describing how
one bank's practice of making "loans to risky borrowers at interest rates that are the same as or
better than those given to top-tier borrowers" has resulted in solid profits as other lending
institutions face financial crisis).
197 See BAIR, supra note 25, at 10- 13; Kenneth, supra note 15 1, at 712 (noting that banks'
"lucrative revenue stream" from overdraft products may pose the largest barrier to banks
stepping up to provide payday loan-replacing products and services).
198 See BAIR, supra note 25, at 11, 13.
199See id. at 12.
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3. Incentivized Bank Entry
Consequently, governmental institutions must go beyond merely
suggesting that banks enter the post-payday loan void and must
provide incentives to encourage banks to offer low-cost, short-term,
small-dollar consumer loans .200 Accordingly, the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (FDIC) has created a set of Affordable
Small-Dollar Loan Guidelines for its member banks interested in
entering the small-dollar, short-term consumer loan market .2 0' These
Guidelines not only outline general criteria for such loans, but also
note that "such products offered in a responsible, safe and sound
manner will warrant favorable Community Reinvestment Act (CRA)
consideration. 202  This favorable CRA consideration can be a
valuable incentive for banks unsure of entering this new market
because of the role such consideration plays in agency evaluation of
bank applications to expand or merge their business. 0
The Ohio payday loan legislation, H.B. 545, offers another type of
incentive approach and, in doing so, addresses several of the concerns
raised regarding payday loans. In addition to implementing a
fee-inclusive rate cap at 28%,204 H.B. 545 provides banks with an
incentive in the form of small loan-linked deposits, which are below
market rate deposits made by the state with participating institutions
to subsidize the cost of providing these new small loan products. 0
While these incentive approaches represent a move in the right
direction, they fail to address the fundamental problem that plagues
the voluntary model. Hercules and the Hydra are once again
illustrative. In this version, Hercules and lolaus decapitate the Hydra
but do not complete the task by burning the monster's necks to
prevent the heads from growing back. Rather, they offer to give a
positive recommendation for anyone who steps in to finish the job, or
perhaps they help a passerby to buy a weapon suitable for finishing
off the Hydra. As was the case with the voluntary approach to
providing an alternative to payday loans, this analogy shows the faults
with the incentive approach. Once again, this approach relies on the
200See Clinton & Schwarzenegger, supra note 177.
201 Press Release, FDIC, Affordable Small Loan Guidelines (Dec. 4, 2006),
http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2006/Pr06lO7a.html.
202Id
203 See infra note 213 and accompanying text.
201H.R. 545, 127th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2007) (adding as OHIO REV. CODE §
132 1.35(C): ...Interest' means all charges payable directly or indirectly by a borrower to a
licensee as a condition to a loan, including fees, loan origination charges. service charges.
renewal charges, credit insurance premiums, and any ancillary product sold in connection with a
loan made pursuant to sections 1321.35 to 1321.48 of the Revised Code").
205 H.R. 545 (changes to 01-11 REV. CODE §§ 135.63, .68-.70).
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market to create a solution. The history of the payday loan and its
predecessors is rife with the failure of markets to adequately serve
people outside of the credit mainstream with wealth-building rather
than wealth-depleting products. 0 The risk is that, despite the
incentives, banks may not see enough reasons to enter this market
when other, more profitable alternatives exist.2 07
4. Mandatory Bank Entry
The third approach to bringing banks into the role of providing
alternatives to payday loans is the most heavy-handed. Unlike the
voluntary and incentive options standing alone, the mandate approach
eliminates reliance on markets and requires banks to offer low-cost,
short-term, small-dollar consumer loans to their customers. Such a
requirement can be made through the structure and enforcement
provisions of the CRA. This mandate should not come alone,
however; banks ought to be given incentives as well. The incentives
described in the previous section, such as offering positive CRA
credit, offer a good starting point as to what sort of carrots are
appropriate to pair with the stick. By eliminating the role of the
market, the mandate approach solves the problems associated with its
lesser siblings. Hercules and Jolaus not only decapitate the Hydra, but
they personally ensure that the heads will not grow back.
While free-market adherents may recoil from such a solution, there
are in fact legitimate and long-standing bases for such an approach.
Even Alexander Hamilton, writing on the role of a national bank,
acknowledged that such an institution existed first to serve the public
good; private profits were to remain secondary. 0 A more modern
recognition of this public purpose exists in the CRA. The CRA was
created because many banks regularly refuised to lend to a segment of
the population based on geographic location, a practice known as
"redlining. 2 09 To end this practice, Congress not only indicated its
preference that banks "make loans in their local communities and in
[low to middle income] neighborhoods," but also "threaten[ed]
sanctions for banks that do not comnply." 210 Congress recognized that
"regulated financial institutions have continuing and affirmative
206See supra Part IV.A (discussing goals); supra Part IV.C (presenting the historical
pattern of high-cost lending).207 See supra notes 197-99 and accompanying text.208 Aexander Hamilton, Report on a National Bank, in 1 REPORTS OF THE SECRETARY OF
THE TREASURY OF THE UNITED STATES 54,67 (1837).
209 R ICHARD D. MARSico, DEMOCRATIZING CAPITAL: THE HISTORY, LAW AND REFORM
OF THE COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT ACT 11 (2005).
210 Id.
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obligation to help meet the credit needs of the local communities in
which they are chartered. 21 1  Viewed in light of Hamilton's
observation, Congress was acknowledging that federally regulated
banks were in fact placing profit above public good. In fact, Senator
William Proxmire, the CRA's primary sponsor, described the Act as
"'provid[ing] that a bank charter is indeed a franchise to serve local
convenience and needs, including credit needs."' 212
While the CRA empowered federal banking agencies to assess a
bank's performance and to deny bank expansion applications if that
performance was inadequate, 1 Congress attempted to draw a clear
line between "allocating credit and influencing bank lending
decisions., 1  Credit allocation, generally understood as
"establish~ing] lending quotas [or] requir[ing] banks to lend to
particular persons," was strongly disfavored, even by CRA
215
supporters. Yet there is an inherent contradiction in threatening to
penalize banks for avoiding certain markets, 1 while at the same time
taking the position that banks should remain free to determine
"amounts, types, terms, or recipients of loans." 1  Looking further, it
is apparent that Congress's position on credit allocation in the CRA
was one of scope. Broad mandates to influence banks to meet their
"continuing and affirmative obligation 218 to provide lending products
appropriate to their communities are permissible 2 1 9 but the regulatory
role stops short of interfering with individual loan applications. 2
Within these bounds, the CRA provides a basis for requiring banks to
provide fair alternatives to payday loans. The void created with the
end of payday loans is equivalent to the void left by banks through the
practice of redlining.22 1 To influence banks to cover that territory
through the threat of penalties is consistent with the purpose and goals
of the CRA.
211 12 U.S.C § 290 1 (a)(3) (2000).
212 MARSICO, supra note 209, at 14-15 (quoting Community Credit Needs. Hearings on S.
406 Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 95th Cong. 2 (1977)
(statement of Sen. William Proxmire)). Even opponents of the CRA acknowledged their support
of its purpose to provide credit to inner city areas. Id at 15.
213 See id at 18-19; Chin, supra note 92, at 750.214 MARSICO, supra note 209, at 11.
2 15Id. at I11- 12, 21-22.
216 Geography was used in the CR.A as a proxy for economic class; the problem was that
banks would not lend to low and middle income people, who happened to live in the same area
as each other. See id at 11, 13.
2171d at 12, 29-30.
218 12 U.S.C § 290 1 (a)(3) (2000).
219 See MARSICO, supra note 209, at 22 (declaring as legitimate the CRA's requirement for
banks to serve public purposes and needs).
220Id.
221 See supra note 209 and accompanying text.
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The FDIC's Affordable Small Loan Guidelines provide a starting
point for integrating a payday loan alternative into the structure of the
CRA. While the current approach is to offer positive CRA credit for
banks that offer lending products within the guidelines, 222 a more
thorough approach could involve applying the stick portion of the
CRA in addition to offering a carrot. Congress need only determine
that banks located in communities affected by payday lending2 23 have
a "continuing and affirmative obligation" to meet the need for
affordable short-term, small dollar consumer credit, and then enforce
that obligation by applying the positive and negative CRA credit
structure to banks' involvement in this market. If banks offer
appropriate products, they should receive positive credit, as with the
FDIC guidelines. If banks fail to meet the need, or offer inappropriate
products, they ought to be penalized with negative evaluations of their
practices.
There remains an even stronger option for mandating bank entry,
though it should be reserved for use only if a CRA credit-based
solution fails to produce the bank entry necessary to fill the
post-payday loan void. As noted by Senator Proxmire in his
explanation of the CRA, "' [b]anks and thrifts are indeed chartered to
serve the convenience and needs of their communities."' 2 24 If the
purpose of the bank charter is truly for service of the public good, 2
then it stands to reason that failure to serve that good could constitute
grounds for revocation of that charter. Certainly such a step is
significant, and would likely be unreasonable if such a penalty were
given solely for the failure to provide affordable small loans. Such a
failure, however, could weigh heavily on a consideration of a bank's
practices as a whole. In the light of the present sub-prime crisis and
rampant bank behavior favoring profits over the public good, such a
solution might not be so far-fetched as it would have been just a few
226years ago.
222 See FDIC, supra note 20 1.
223 While earlier in their development, payday lenders tended to clutter in urban areas, by
2006, payday lending had established a strong presence throughout the state of Ohio.
RoTHsTEIN & DILLMAN, CONTINUED GROWTH, supra note 3 1, at 4. Similar patterns exist across
the nation. Hawke, supra note 30 ("California alone has more payday loan offices-nearly
2,000-than it does McDonalds and Burger Kings, and other states are not very far behind.").
224 MARSICO, supra note 209, at 14 (quoting 123 CONG. REc. 17,630 (1977) (statement of
Sen. William Proxmire)).
225 See also Hamilton, supra note 208, at 67.
226 As noted previously, even market advocate Richard Posner has admitted that rampant
deregulation may have been a mistake. See Posner, supra note 115.
2008] 159
160 CASE WESTERN RESER VE LA W REVIEW [o.5:
V1. CONCLUSION
This Note attempts to look beyond the surface of the payday
lending problem and to reveal and address the reality behind
the reasons. While the main reasons behind the payday lending
problem-poverty and greed-appear to be with us whether we like it
or not, other causes are well within our reach to address. This Note
has shown through an analysis of the debt trap phenomena-the
industry's dependence on repeat business, and the high rates
charged-that payday loans are problematic by design. Furthermore,
the implementation of payday loans is problematic because of
profound market failure and widespread abusive practices.
The reasons for these design and implementation problems are
rooted in federal and state laws. By choosing to favor deregulation
and free market ideologies, the federal government not only created
circumstances that led to the birth of the payday loan, but also created
a legal vacuum that states moved to fill in a variety of ways, some
effective and some not. Having established the problem, this Note
uses a model based on the myth of Hercules and the Lernaean Hydra
to determine that an effective solution to the payday loan problem as
a whole requires not only prohibitive action, such as rate caps, but
also effective and affordable alternatives.
These alternatives are best provided by banks, not only because of
their position and resources, but also because of the deep-seated
obligations that banks have to serve the public good. Market-based,
voluntary plans for bank entry lack the ability to bring banks to the
role of providing affordable payday loan alternatives; plans based on
incentivizing banks likewise fall short. Concluding it is necessary to
mandate that banks provide alternatives, this Note provides
suggestions on how both the Community Reinvestment Act
evaluation system and challenges to bank charters might be used to
accomplish this goal.
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